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Reasonable Efforts, Unreasonable Effects:
A Retrospective Analysis of the
'Reasonable Efforts' Clause in the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
WENDY WHITING BLOME
The Catholic University of America
The National Catholic School of Social Service
Hidden in the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 are
two words that came to summarize the expectations of the law, typify its
vagueness, and predict its controversy-"reasonable efforts." This article
explores five factors to clarify the policy implications of the reasonable
efforts phrase:
" the disproportionately large effects of the requirement for "reasonable
efforts;"
" the unanticipated consequences of the clause;
" the shift in the locus of control from social service agencies to court
authorities;
" the reduction in discretion for direct and administrative social work
personnel; and
" the social, political, and economic realities that framed the reasonable
efforts debate.
"One of the greatest delusions in the
world is the hope that evils in the
world are to be cured by legislation"
(Cole, 1983, p. 39).
The legislative framers wanted to stop foster care drift, to
change the prevailing philosophy from rescuing children to pre-
serving families, and to establish procedural safeguards for chil-
dren and parents. After years of debate and compromise, the
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values and intentions of child welfare advocates and legislators
were captured in the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 1980 (P.L. 96-272). Hidden within the landmark legislation
were two words that, over the years, would come to summarize
the expectations of the law, typify its vagueness, and predict its
controversy-"reasonable efforts." That undefined prescript has
come to dominate practice with profound impact on the lives of
children, families, social workers, administrators, judges, and at-
torneys in the child welfare system. The drafters of the legislation
never suspected that the reasonable efforts clause would become
the key mechanism for enforcing the intent of the law. Passed
in 1980 the law encompassed the Carter Administration concern
that states provide quality care for children and families. Soon,
however, it collided with the Reagan forces determined to reduce
government intervention and cut Federal costs.
This article will explore five explanatory factors in an attempt
to clarify the policy implications of the reasonable efforts phrase.
It will begin with a brief statement of the historical perspec-
tive and end by linking the factors in an interpretive framework.
Specifically attention will be focused on:
" the disproportionately large effects, given the limited legislative
attention, of the requirement for reasonable efforts;
" the unanticipated consequences of the clause;
" the shift in the locus of control for certain child welfare decisions
from social service agencies to court authorities;
" the reduction in discretion for direct and administrative social
work personnel that accompanied the shift; and
" the environmental (social, political, and economic) realities that
framed the reasonable efforts debate.
Introduction
The term "reasonable efforts" appears twice in the law.1 First
as part of a requirement that states prepare a plan assuring com-
pliance with sixteen items including ". . . effective October 1,
1983... in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior
to placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the
need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make
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it possible for the child to return to his home. . ." (96-272; Sec.
471(a)(15)).
Second, the act requires the courts to review agency actions
or "efforts" to determine if they are "reasonable." Specifically
"'... the removal from the home was the result of a judicial de-
termination... that continuation therein would be contrary to
the welfare of such child and (effective October 1, 1983) that rea-
sonable efforts... have been made.. ."(96-272; Sec. 472(a)(1)).
A positive determination of reasonable efforts must be made for
social service agencies to qualify for federal matching funds for
an eligible child.
There is a curious underlying philosophy in reimbursing
states for AFDC foster care only. Approximately 40 percent of
children in care qualify for AFDC (House of Representatives,
Report 101-395, 1990) and the funding patterns still favor out-
of-home care. A state social service official testifying before the
Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families was clear:
... [11f there is a IVE eligible child in foster care.., the Federal
government subsidizes that placement... 40 or 50 percent. When
the state decides that the child should go home.., suddenly the
state has to pay the full boat. There's absolutely no incentive to
reunify those families (House of Representatives Report 101-395,
1990, p. 77).
Nowhere in the law or the subsequent regulations are the
words "reasonable efforts" defined; that is left to the states and
their court systems. A few states have included definitions in
relevant statutes, but their attempts have added little real clarity.
"Reasonable efforts" becomes "reasonable diligence and care" in
Florida and "due diligence" in Minnesota (Shotton, 1990, p. 225).
In the simplest context, reasonable efforts is whatever a court
says it is, but this begs the question and allows for great variation
(Seaberg, 1986).
Vagueness is not unusual in policy. Legislative teams devise
policies because they want changes in the external world. Policy
intentions are often not written in the legislation because they re-
flect the expectations, or hopes of policy framers about the effects
or outcomes of policies (Jansson, 1990, p. 381). The interpretations
are crafted later in regulatory or judicial language.
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In the last decade, extensive litigation, more than 80 cases in
20 states, has been brought on behalf of children in state care
through the child welfare, juvenile justice, and mental health
systems (House of Representatives Report 101-395, 1990, p. 195).
Failure to make "reasonable efforts" has been a contributing factor
in at least 46 cases of violation of P.L. 96-272. Virtually all have
been settled against the agency through class action suits, consent
decrees, or agreements in which the court retained a monitoring
function (House of Representatives Report 101-395,1990, p. 195).
One case, Suter v. Artist M., began in Illinois and ended in a
Supreme Court decision in March of 1992. The ruling determined
that beneficiaries of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980 do not have a private right, under the act itself or under
a civil rights statute, to sue to enforce its provisions including the
reasonable efforts component (Kopels & Rycraft, 1993; Senate,
1992). The law requires only that states write and have approved
state plans which address reasonable efforts; it does not, accord-
ing to the Court, require that the plan be implemented.
In essence the Court recognized that the law was written
in vague language and therefore Congress had not intended to
create a private enforcement right (American Journal of Law &
Medicine, 1992). In the aftermath of the decision advocates wor-
ried that the Court had foreclosed lawsuits that challenge the
states' practices based on the reasonable efforts provision (Kopels
& Rycraft, 1993). Others heralded the decision as a protection
against an avalanche of cases brought by individuals unhappy
with the results of State Juvenile Court actions (Senate, 1992). En-
forcement options still exist, however. The Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) may reduce the level of reimburse-
ment to a state if the state plan is not administered and the court
must still approve a child's removal and make findings that there
have been efforts to reunify the family (American Journal of Law
& Medicine, 1992).
Historical Perspective
The public law, including the reasonable efforts provisions,
resulted from shifting societal attitudes and reform efforts of the
preceding two decades. A distrust of traditional organizations,
agencies, and professionals; an increased importance placed on
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citizen participation; and a demand for cost containment, moni-
toring, and evaluation all left their mark on the legislation through
the provisions for judicial oversight and establishment of case
review and monitoring systems (Cole, 1983).
On June 17,1980 President Carter signed P.L. 96-272 into law.
Just over six months later the Carter administration proposed im-
plementation of comprehensive regulations that received strong
support from child welfare advocates. Many states, however,
were against the regulations feeling they were too detailed and
intrusive (NACAC, 1990). In the summer of 1981, the newly ap-
pointed Reagan officials opposed implementation of P.L. 96-272
as part of a larger attempt to cut social programs. Initial efforts
to cap Title IVE were defeated in Congress, but the support for
IVB has been consistently restricted. By 1990, allocations still had
not reached the 1980 authorized funding level of $266 million. The
program began at $163.5 million in 1981 and grew to only $246.7 in
1989, less than a ten percent real increase in constant 1981 dollars
(House of Representatives Report 101-395, 1990, p. 69).
The Reagan Administration stalled the regulatory process
needed to carry out the Act's intent (NACAC, 1990) and the first
regulations were not promulgated until May 23, 1983. Dubbed
a virtual restatement of the act, they lacked the substantive di-
rections of the Carter regulations and did not define reasonable
efforts. These regulations were produced during the "paperwork
reduction initiative" inaugurated during the Reagan era. Success
was judged by the number of pages cut and descriptive regula-
tions were seen as too much paper. It is the irony of the political
process that states were desperate for direction during the early
years of the Act, yet had rebuked the specificity of the originally
proposed regulations.
Without definition states put valuable resources into develop-
ing systems that might or might not satisfy future requirements
(NACAC, 1990). Federal audits for compliance with WE were
unclear and inconsistent.
Some states were found out of compliance when other states with...
the same policies and practices were found in compliance. States
within the same region were held to different standards (NACAC,
1990, p. 91).
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Officials who had served in the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) prior to and during the Reagan admin-
istration found the culture of the organization drastically and
precipitously changed. Technical assistance was not part of the
Department vocabulary and the Federal responsibility was de-
fined as fiscal stewardship only.
One striking example serves to exemplify the crippling am-
biguity. Between 1978 and 1981 HHS conducted 20 complete re-
views of child welfare services in individual states. There were
no penalties attached to the reviews, rather they were viewed as a
mutual process of interpreting Federal intent and understanding
state barriers. In 1981, in the middle of reviews, the staff received
calls to come back to Washington, not to complete the partial
reviews, and not to submit reports to the states. Aside from audit
proceedings the Federal authorities were able to offer little assis-
tance to states until 1989 when the review process was reinstated.
As states questioned the intent of the law, HHS published
policy clarifications on an ad hoc, but prolific, basis. Officials
estimated that by 1990 all the policies promulgated constituted a
stack ten inches tall, and the collection included only one issuance
concerning reasonable efforts. Again the terms were not defined.
In 1994 states were reminded that:
(In) order to ensure implementation of the reasonable efforts re-
quirements, states should include in their program manuals a pro-
vision that services will be provided to prevent removal ... and
that the judicial determination must include a finding to the effect
that.., reasonable efforts were made... (HDS Issuance January
13, 1984).
In case states were confused they are also reminded that:
... [I]f the court finds that the agency's preventive services efforts
have not been reasonable, Federal financial participation may not
be claimed for that child making... close communication and coor-
dination between the state agency and the court ... essential (HDS
Issuance January 13, 1984).
The services considered "reasonable" were not listed in the
Federal communique, but did receive limited attention in the
legislative debate on the original bill.
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Services must first be made available to the child and family and'
may include, for example, homemaker, day care, 24 hour crisis
intervention, emergency caretaker, emergency temporary shelter,
group homes for adolescents, and emergency counseling (House of
Representatives Report 96-136, 1979, p. 46).
In sum, the reasonable efforts clause has assumed a signifi-
cant importance demanding a consideration of factors that may
explain its development.
Explanatory Factors
1). The Incidental Essential:
An Incidental Policy Phrase Becomes An Essential Implementation
Issue. An oxymoron is an idiosyncratic ripple in the English
language that allow contradictory words to be linked for empha-
sis like "incidental essential." "Reasonable efforts" is the incidental
essential of the child welfare law as it has come to symbolize the
lack of quality service, the often strained relationship between
agencies and courts, and the battle cry of parents and children.
The inclusion of the reasonable efforts clause in the law was
incidental, yet its effect has proven to be surprisingly essential.
The "incidental essential" has fascinated policy analysts who
have watched small beginnings have huge and unanticipated
outcomes. A classic example is Moynihans Maximum Feasible Mis-
understanding in which he examined the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964. The act included a clause that community action pro-
grams be "... . administered with the maximum feasible participa-
tion.. ." of the poor (Moynihan, 1969, p. 89). Unnoticed it slipped
by until the implementation stage when the true meaning of the
words challenged the assumptions of politicians and profession-
als about who should hold power and control. Quoting a lawyer
who had worked on a planning task force"... I don't think it
ever occurred to me, or to many others, that the representatives
of the poor must necessarily be poor themselves" (Moynihan,
1969, p. 180).
Similarily, Congress did not negotiate in detail the meaning of
"reasonable efforts," but apparently assumed that it was central
to the intent of P.L. 96-272. While in the course of debating the
bill, some advocates made wholesale slashing charges against
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agencies, foster parents, and social workers" (Pine, 1986, p. 349),
there is no evidence that the deliberation included discussion of
what constitutes "reasonable" efforts to forestall the problems
being so vigorously attacked. Congress put faith in the courts to
enforce "good practice" as would be determined on a case-by-
case basis through the interpretation of reasonable efforts.
By 1990, ten years after the law, the "incidental essential" had
become central. "[Tihe requirement to make 'reasonable efforts'-
the core of the law and premise behind preventive programs-
had not been meaningfully implemented by HHS, and such ef-
forts have not been made in many cases" (House of Representa-
tives Report 101-395, 1990, p. 81).
2). Systemic Suicide:
Getting More Than Expected and Less Than Imagined. With any
major legislation there is a risk that the meager money can not
meet the grand design. Although there was an intent to support
child welfare agencies to provide prevention and reunification
services, the funds were not granted, but the legislative aims
remained on the books. Early in the implementation phase social
work professionals were leary, "I think that even if fully appropri-
ated, the 266 million dollars will not be enough. But, having given
it, the Congress may be lulled into a false sense of having 'once
and for all' addressed the child welfare problem" (Cole, 1983,
p. 39). The 1980s were also fiscally difficult for other programs
aimed at remedying children's problems.
The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 saw a 20
percent drop in monies from 1981 to 1989 (in constant 1981 dollars)
during a time when reports of child maltreatment were up 82 per-
cent. [Flunding for the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act declined from $100 million to $66.7 million in ten years; and
the federal support for mental health services [dropped to] $503
million in FY 1989, $17 million less than the sum of the categorical
programs prior to consolidation into the block grant in 1981 (House
of Representatives Report 101-395, 1990, pps. 71, 10).
Even recognizing the legislation as an opportunity for im-
proved service, professionals feared failure as it would not cure
all that was wrong with services to children and their families. "It
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does not speak to the training of social workers, the size of their
caseload, the quality of their supervision and leadership, or their
turnover" (Cole, 1983, p. 39).
Indeed the reasonable efforts debate has highlighted deficien-
cies in social work preparation. The priority graduate schools
place on the rehabilitation model ignores the public sector need
for workers trained in social care modalities. For example it is
possible for a MSW student to graduate without learning how
to negotiate with a client; plan with a parent; make a proper re-
ferral; develop a strengths/needs assessment; write an ongoing,
incremental case plan; and manage services. "The fact that there
are very few social workers with enough training to implement
fully a law calling for extremely skillful practice is another irony
of child welfare" (Harrison, 1988, p 87).
Without addressing staffing or training concerns, the reason-
able efforts requirement expects child welfare agencies to provide
a "reasonable" level of service to remediate whatever problems
brought the family to the attention of the protection authorities.
The problem definition is likely to include needs for housing, alco-
hol or drug treatment, mental health intervention, or employment
services. In most locales the child protection agency does not have
direct control over the agencies that provide these services and
can not ensure that a CPS client will receive efficient and effective
services.
The reasonable efforts mandate has highlighted the lack of
coordination among agencies serving families and exposed the
problem-specific funding that typifies social service policy. Multi-
problem families belong everywhere and nowhere, but the re-
sponsibility often rests with the child welfare agency. Although
child welfare professionals may assert that protection agencies
"... have not been established as society's response to poverty"
they are often forced to assume that role (Horowitz, 1989, p. 10).
The reform legislation of 1980 did nothing to ".... address the
poverty, unemployment, and racism at the core of so many of the
biological parents' problems" (Cole, 1983, p. 39).
Calls for coordination of departments of mental health, public
health, employment, income maintenance, education, and social
services are wide-spread and pilot projects do exist. The intent
of reasonable efforts, however, is often thwarted not only by
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bureaucratic modes of operation emphasizing top-down manage-
ment and specialized functions, but also by bureaucratic rivalries
(Jansson, 1990). "Even if several agents are joint producers, the
actions of each take place within the territory of others; and every
social agent is essentially a territorial imperialist to some extent"
(Downs, 1967, p. 216).
Perhaps the most significant factor affecting the implemen-
tation of reasonable efforts was the election of Ronald Reagan in
1980. His advocacy for deregulation and decentralization not only
cut federal funding for child welfare services, but also curtailed
assertive monitoring of the new policies (Jansson, 1990). Legis-
lators, during hearings a decade after their initial effort, were
distressed to hear that". . . a recent review of the 1980 foster care
reforms still found no conclusive evidence on the effects of the
reforms" (House of Representatives Report 101-395, 1990, p. 81).
3). Shift in the Locus of Control:
Enter the Law of Control Duplication. In preparing the child wel-
fare bill the drafting committee recognized that " ... the entire
array of possible preventive services are not appropriate in all sit-
uations. The decisions to the appropriateness of specific services
in specific situations will have to be made by the administering
agency" (House of Representatives Report 96-136, 1979, p. 47).
That discretion, however, would be monitored by the courts and
failure to meet the courts' unspecified standards would lead to a
reduction in federal funds due the agency.
Whether seen as establishing a system of checks and balances
or shifting the locus of control from the social service agencies to
the court, the monitoring provision of the law has not enhanced
the stability and predictability for clients. Research conducted in
eight jurisdictions identified ". . . not a single site in our study
where judges found a lack of reasonable efforts in a substan-
tial proportion of cases" (Ratterman, 1986, p. 30). Imposing this
additional level of court review has not yet produced the dis-
crete discriminations on a case-by-case basis that the legislations
intended.
According to the American Bar Association, judges have gaps
in their preparation that make the reasonable efforts determina-
tion difficult:
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* in many states there are no rules or procedures to require selec-
tion of judges specially qualified for juvenile court proceedings;
* no special training is required for judges handling maltreated
children;
• judges are ignorant of mental health, drug abuse, and child
abuse and neglect etiology and treatment; and
• judges often lack knowledge about the services available
through the child welfare agency and the community (NACAC,
1990, p. 64).
Since the bench is totally dependent on others to present
the facts of the case (Horowitz, 1989) information comes from
attorneys representing the agency, the child, or the parents who
have received their information from the social worker. There are
indications, as outlined earlier, that social workers, even those
with masters preparation and experience, need additional train-
ing to fulfill the intent of reasonable efforts. Now overloaded
attorneys and judges must be added to the list of trainees so they
can monitor the performance of overworked social workers and
supervisors.
The increased number of cases before the court, including the
reasonable efforts determinations, has caused legal representa-
tives to request a shift in the allocation of funds to mirror the
change in locus of control.
Fiscal incentives of the Act flow exclusively to social services agen-
cies.... Already overburdened courts have no fiscal incentive and
... no other reason to take serious the reasonable efforts require-
ment (House of Representatives Report 101-395, 1990, p. 83).
The legislative design requires an "explicit judicial determina-
tion that reasonable efforts to prevent removal have been made"
(Congressional Record, 1979, S11708). Agencies and courts, how-
ever, have often opted for a type of acquiescence that does not
refect a meaningful judicial deliberation, like a pre-printed form
signed by the judge or a checklist marked by the judge. The
limited reviews conducted by HHS monitors for the existence of
a determination by the court, but does not look at what services
were actually delivered or the appropriateness of the services.
The oversight provision created by the act illustrates two
"laws" postulated by observers of large bureaucracies:
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The Law of Control Duplication: Any attempt to control one large
organization tends to generate another.
Law of Ever Expanding Control: The quantity and detail of reporting
required by monitoring bureaus tends to rise steadily over time,
regardless of the amount or nature of the activity being monitored
(Downs, 1967, p. 262).
The court now needs an organization to review the work of the
service delivery organization.
4). Reduction in Discretion:
Watching the Many Watch the Few The importance and com-
plexity of the decisions made in child welfare cases demands
openness and collaboration. To argue against oversight would be
to ignore the abuses that led to P.L. 96-272. To say social workers
do not make serious errors in judgement and activity would be
to defend the indefensible. Monitoring, by itself, however, does
not improve service delivery. Ordering a social worker to find
housing for a welfare mother who receives $350 per month in
an area where rents average over $800 and the public housing
waiting list is over four years does not make it happen. Barring
extreme incompetency, the worker knew housing was needed
and, had it been available, would have acquired it. Unless social
service administrators, housing officials, real estate tycoons, land-
lords, city politicians, and the public become aware of the pressing
need, the monitoring of this case has reinforced the obvious-the
woman needs a place to live.
Guidelines offered to help attorneys and judges comply with
the reasonable efforts requirement are detailed and proscriptive.
If followed as written, the social worker would spend time brief-
ing at least three attorneys and attorneys would re-investigate the
entire case.
Attorneys representing any party in hearings in which reasonable
efforts determinations are made have the following responsibilities.
[Emphasis added]
1. Prior to representing a client in a dependency case, all attorneys
should be familiar with:
a. the causes and available treatment for child abuse and neglect,
b. the local child welfare agency's procedures for complying with
reasonable efforts requirements,
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c. the child welfare and family preservation services available in
the community and the problems they are designed to address,
and
d. local experts who can provide... consultation and testimony
on the reasonableness of efforts.
2. Responsibilities after undertaking representation:
a. interview the client... with the agency social worker present,
b. investigate the removal of the child,
c. investigate the reunification efforts,
d. interview staff of other agencies, and
e. review the agency's file.
In addition to the above responsibilities attorneys representing a
child welfare agency should:
1. assure that the agency administrators make efforts to keep chil-
dren in their homes,
2. accept the obligation to prove that reasonable efforts were made,
3. refuse to represent the child,
4. interview the social worker,
5. provide agency records to [other] attorneys,
6. subpoena witnesses who can testify to the efforts of the agency,
and
7. provide the court with information about available community
services.
Attorneys for parents and children should additionally:
1. determine the client's goals,
2. interview the social worker,
3. determine the ability to return home,
4. require evidence on efforts made by the agency,
5. subpoena witness to testify on behalf of the client,
6. present evidence,
7. request court orders for specific services, and
8. ensure that any settlement is incorporated in the case plan
(NCJFCJ, 1989, p.13-1 7 ).
Depending on the system existent in a particular location a
single case could be reviewed by numerous authorities-court ap-
pointed special advocates, administrative review teams, judges,
attorneys, internal agency review teams, and federal auditors or
state auditors. With minor exceptions the role of each of these
systems is to do what a good social work supervisor can and
should do: review the appropriateness of the case assessment,
assure that the services are targeted and individualized, monitor
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the provision of service, advocate for additional services, and
remove workers who are unable to perform.
Some agencies have felt their discretion significantly curtailed
and have interpreted the reasonable efforts clause to mean chil-
dren can not be removed in an emergency if preventive services
had not been attempted. While that was not the intent of the
law, feeling all actions must be justified in hind-sight caused one
worker to lament "Every time I go into an emergency situation I
know that everyone from my supervisor to the judge will have
hours to debate a decision I must make in several minutes."
5). Changing Environment:
Holding the World Still While the Policy Catches On. Policy pro-
nouncements are forever-until they are changed. Social service
needs are just forever. Since P.L. 96-272 was conceptualized and
passed the condition of human need has intensified and the sys-
tem of care has disintegrated. Witness 1988: 500,000 children in
out-of-home care; 375,000 infants born drug exposed; deaths from
child abuse totaled 1,200; 42 percent of the children who entered
foster care were under six years old (House of Representatives
Report 101-395, 1990, pps. 5, 7, 8).
At the same time, the legislative oversight committee noted
that in hearings held over the ten year implementation period not
one representative of a public agency had come before the Com-
mittee with anything near the recommended caseload number.
"The 20-30 children per worker.., standard was developed more
than a decade ago when the problems were much less difficult and
must less complex" (House of Representatives Report 101-395,
1990, p. 58). Despite the increasingly challenging cases, however,
workloads top 80 families in many urban agency offices.
With needs expanding and resources contracting, policy and
programmatic pundits are challenged.
We mount limited focus programs to cope with broad gauge prob-
lems. We devote limited resources to long-standing and stubborn
problems. [We concentrate attention on changing the attitudes
and behavior of target groups without ... attention to the institu-
tional structures and social arrangements that ... keep them 'target
groups' (Weiss in Gallagher, 1981, p. 45).
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The changing environment in which the reasonable efforts
criteria exists calls for a re-assertion of what is already known,
but perhaps forgotten. A "back to basics" model of good casework
practice is, in essence, the response to reasonable efforts as defined
by a three point guideline:
" sustained activity with.., the parents to engage and maintain
them in relevant services including follow through despite re-
jection or denial, keeping a log of the date and substance of
every contact noting new agreements of who will do what and
when,
" relevance of the services provided to the problems that brought
children into care.. . , and
" accuracy of problem specification upon which the case plan [is]
based (Seaberg, 1986, p. 474-5).
Numerous court cases have challenged the 'reasonableness' of
an agency's actions, for example, when the client was told what to
do, but not actually assisted in meeting the conditions (Seaberg,
1986; Shotton, 1990). Agencies have failed to make reasonable
efforts, according to court rulings, when services were not tailored
to the mother's intellectual limitations, services were unrealistic
in light of the financial circumstances of the parents, services
were not provided to counteract the mental illness of the parent,
the case plan did not include services aimed at locating housing
when that was the sole reason for the agency's custody, and the
agency had not transported a mother for visitation with a child in
foster care (Shotton, 1990). In brief the agencies had not performed
appropriate assessments and case plans, provided intensive case
management, and remained focused on the presenting problems.
Juggling the possible vs. the probable; the absolute vs. the
available; the realistic vs. the radical is the business of reasonable
efforts. The official federal position was that reasonable efforts
were limited to the services available, but unofficially there was
a suspicion that agencies were not always as creative as possible
in devising and funding new services.
Conclusion
Reasonable efforts is the ideological thrust of the permanency
planning act. The intent is captured in the words "reasonable
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efforts," but the concept is held hostage by the vagueness and
varied interpretations of the clause. A multitude of hopes get com-
pressed into one, little, overworked clause that grows stronger as
the ability to meet its essence grows weaker. Decisions on the
reasonableness of any action are made on a case-by-case basis,
and therefore lack uniformity across the country and even within
a jurisdiction. Has the agency behaved reasonably if a mother is
offered drug treatment but refuses it because the clinic is across
town? Has the intent of the law been met when housing is a
need, but the worker is unable to find affordable lodging for a
family? Would it be a reasonable expectation for a worker to see
a family twice a week in one jurisdiction and not reasonable in
another area?
An ideological framework for viewing reasonable efforts
evolves. Begin with the notion that an important, but briefly stated
concept was slipped into the law when P. L. 96-272 was intro-
duced. Soon it became clear, however, that the reasonable efforts
clause, and related provisions in the law, had shifted the com-
plex decision making process in child welfare cases to the courts
and had emphasized legal interpretations of casework practice
tasks. The courts were untrained and unprepared for their new
role, and the agencies lacked guidance and interpretation of what
constituted a reasonable effort.
Ecological and economic shifts occurred to produce more dif-
ficult client problems to be met with reduced funding and lim-
ited Federal support. Client families were most likely to have
needs that spanned the housing, health and mental health, and
addiction continuum,as well as serious child protective issues.
The result was an unanticipated consequence-reasonable efforts
became the scapegoat for a lack of money, few qualified staff,
and limited coordination among service agencies and the courts.
What was initially a legislative afterthought became the focus of
increasingly disparate interpretations and the center of numerous
individual and class action litigations specifying actions that were
not reasonable.
Regardless of the shifting sands of a changing environment,
however, the real issue behind reasonable efforts is human value
and a human rights-based responsibility (Seaberg, 1986). It is not
worth doing because Federal money is attached, it is worth doing
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because it is right that every child and family receive a "reason-
able" level of care when their union is at risk. Reasonable efforts
will never be ideal efforts, nor will they be minimum statements-
they will be reasonable given the value placed on children. It
would appear that the United States has exactly the kind and
quality of child welfare system for which society is willing to pay
(Besharov, 1985).
Note
1. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 is an amendment
to the Social Security Act which provides three major means of funding
services: Title IVE pays a portion of the foster care rate for children who would
otherwise be eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
payments on their behalf, Title IVB provides states money for child welfare
services without Federally imposed income or categorical restrictions; and
Title XX funds social service training.
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